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I

srael’s Strategic Future: The Final Report of Project Daniel” was completed in mid-January 2003, several months before the start of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, and transmitted by hand to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
The underlying rationale of “Project Daniel” was the presumption that Israel
urgently needs a coherent plan for dealing with existential threats, and that we
(The Group) were well-positioned intellectually and professionally to propose such a plan. The project was originally based on an overriding concern
for the possible fusion of certain weapons of mass destruction (WMD)capacity with irrational adversaries. Project Daniel concluded, however, that
the primary threats to Israel’s physical survival were more likely to come
from enemies that were not irrational. With this in mind, the members of our
study group proceeded to consider a broad variety of complex issues related
to deterrence, defense, preemption, and war-fighting.
Combining legal with strategic analyses, The Group linked the
concept of “anticipatory self-defense” to various preemption scenarios and to
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (20 September
2002). The study group also closely examined the prospects for expanded
strategic cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem, with particular
reference to maintaining Israel’s “qualitative edge” and associated issues of
necessary funding. Project Daniel looked very closely at a recommended
paradigm shift to deal with various low intensity and long-range WMD
threats to Israel, and also considered the specific circumstances under which
Israel should purposefully end its current posture of “nuclear ambiguity.”
Overall, The Group urged continuing constructive support to the United
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States-led Global War On Terrorism and stipulated that Israel combine a
strengthening of multilayered active defenses with a credible, secure, and decisive nuclear deterrent. This recognizable retaliatory (second-strike) force is
recommended to be fashioned with the capacity to destroy some 10 to 20
high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent enemy states in the Middle
East—an objective entirely consistent with our explicit assumption that the
main goal of Israel’s nuclear forces must always be deterrence ex ante, not
revenge ex post.
The Group recognized a very basic asymmetry between Israel and
the Arab and Iranian world concerning, inter alia, the desirability of peace;
the absence of democracy; the acceptability of terror as a legitimate weapon;
and the overwhelming demographic advantage of the Arab/Iran world. With
this in mind, Project Daniel concluded that non-conventional exchanges between Israel and adversary states must always be scrupulously avoided and
that Israel must do whatever is needed to maintain its conventional supremacy in the region. Facing a growing anarchy in world affairs and an increasing
isolation in the world community, Israel is strongly encouraged by members
of the study group to incorporate its considered recommendations into codified Israel Defense Force doctrine, and to systematically expand Israeli strategic studies into a more disciplined field of inquiry. In the end, Israel’s
survival will depend largely upon policies of its own making, and these policies will be best-informed by The Group’s proposed steps regarding deterrence, defense, war-fighting, and preemption options.
Today, with a steadily advancing nuclear threat from Iran, the preemption option has likely become even more compelling. At the same time,
the enormous operational difficulties that would be associated with preemptive destruction of pertinent Iranian nuclear infrastructures suggest that Israel may ultimately have to rely instead upon expanded and improved
nuclear deterrence. It is almost certainly such thinking that occasioned
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s public remarks about Israel’s nuclear capacity on 11 December 2006. These remarks were assuredly not a “slip of the
tongue,” as was reported widely in the media. Rather, pursuant to Project
Daniel, they were the entirely logical first-step in taking Israel’s bomb “out
of the basement.”

Louis René Beres is Professor of International Law at Purdue University and holds
a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He has published widely on matters of international
law, national security affairs, and Israeli security. His articles have appeared in more than
100 magazines and journals.
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Israel, Sun-Tzu, and The Art of War
Although The Group’s collaborative analyses drew upon very contemporary strategic thinking, we were also mindful of certain much-earlier investigations of war, power, and survival. One such still-relevant investigation
can be found in Sun-Tzu’s The Art of War. The following brief section of this article uses Sun-Tzu to elucidate The Group’s main ideas and recommendations.
Sun-Tzu’s The Art of War, written sometime in the fifth century BCE,
synthesized a coherent set of principles designed to produce military victory and
minimize the chances of military defeat. Examined together with Israel’s Strategic Future (the Final Report of Project Daniel) the full corpus of this work should
now be studied closely by all who wish to strengthen Israel’s military posture
and its associated order of battle. At a time when the leaders of particular states
might soon combine irrationality with weapons of mass destruction, the members of Project Daniel were markedly determined to augment current facts and
figures with dialectical reasoning, imagination, and creativity.
Israel, we reported, must continue its “imperative to seek peace
through negotiation and diplomatic processes wherever possible.” Indeed,
“This imperative, codified at the United Nations Charter and in multiple authoritative sources of international law, shall always remain the guiding
orientation of Israel’s foreign policy.” What are Sun-Tzu’s principles concerning negotiation and diplomacy? Political initiatives and agreements may be
useful, he instructs, but purposeful military preparations should never be neglected. The primary objective of every state should be to weaken enemies
without actually engaging in armed combat. This objective links the ideal of
“complete victory” to a “strategy for planning offensives.” In Chapter Four,
“Military Disposition,” Sun-Tzu tells his readers: “One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks. . . . Those
who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth.
Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven.”
Project Daniel took note. Today, with the threat of Iranian nuclearization, the whole world is taking note. Recognizing the dangers of relying
too heavily upon active defenses such as anti-ballistic missile systems, a reliance whereby Israel would likely bury itself away “below the lowest depths
of Earth,” Project Daniel boldly advises that Israel take certain prompt initiatives in removing existential threats. These initiatives include striking first
(preemption) against enemy WMD development, manufacturing, storage,
control, and deployment centers—a recommendation fully consistent with
longstanding international law regarding “anticipatory self-defense.”
If, for any reason, the doctrine of preemption should fail to prevent
an enemy Arab state or Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the Daniel
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group advises that Israel cease immediately its current policy of nuclear ambiguity, and proceed at once to a position of open nuclear deterrence. (It
would seem that Prime Minister Olmert’s 11 December 2006 remarks already
reflect such advice.) Additional to this change in policy, the study group recommends that Israel make perfectly clear to any enemy nuclear state that it
would suffer prompt and maximum-yield nuclear “counter-value” reprisals
for any level of nuclear aggression undertaken against Israel. It should be
noted that counter-force targeting and nuclear war-fighting are described by
Project Daniel as altogether counterproductive for Israel.
Under certain circumstances similar forms of Israeli nuclear deterrence should be directed against enemy states that threaten “existential
harms” through the use of biological weapons. What exactly are existential
harms? Taken literally, an existential threat implies harms that portend a complete annihilation or disappearance of the state. The study group concluded
that certain more limited forms of conventional and unconventional attack
against Israeli civilian concentrations could also constitute an existential
threat. In part our calculations are based upon Israel’s size, high population
density, and particular concentrations of national infrastructure. If the government of Israel heeds the advice of Project Daniel, prospective aggressors
would understand in advance that launching certain kinds of attack would result in their cities turning to vapor and ash.
Following Sun-Tzu, the clear purpose of our recommendation is to
achieve a complete Israeli victory without engaging in actual hostilities. In
the words of our report: “The overriding priority of Israel’s nuclear deterrent
force must always be that it preserves the country’s security without ever having to be fired against any target.”
To preserve itself against any existential threats, some of which may
stem from terrorist organizations as well as from states, Israel should learn
from Sun-Tzu’s repeated emphasis on the “unorthodox.” Drawn from the
conflation of thought that crystalized as Taoism, the ancient strategist observes: “. . . in battle, one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through
the unorthodox.” In a complex passage, Sun-Tzu discusses how the orthodox
may be used in unorthodox ways, while an orthodox attack may be unorthodox when it is unexpected. Taken together with the recommendations of our
study group, this passage represents a subtle tool for operational planning,
one that might usefully exploit an enemy state or terrorist group’s particular
matrix of military expectations.
For Israel, the “unorthodox” should be fashioned not only on the
battlefield, but also before the battle. To prevent the most dangerous forms
of battle, which would be expressions of all-out unconventional warfare often described as “counterforce engagements,” Israel should examine a num40
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ber of promising strategic postures. These postures should focus on a
reasoned shift from an image of “orthodox” rationality to one of somewhat
“unorthodox” irrationality. Project Daniel does, however, confine itself to
prescriptions for certain defensive first-strikes using conventional weapons
and massive counter-value (counter-city) nuclear reprisals.
Everyone who studies Israeli nuclear strategy has heard about the
so-called “Samson Option.” This is generally thought to be a last resort strategy wherein Israel’s nuclear weapons are used not for prevention of war or
even for war-waging, but simply as a last spasm of vengeance against an enemy state that had launched massive (probably unconventional) counter-city
and/or counterforce attacks against Israel. In this situation, Israel’s leaders,
faced with national extinction, would conclude that even though the Jewish
State would not survive, it would “die” together with its destroyers.
How does the “Samson Option” appear to the Arab/Iranian world?
Israel, it would seem, may resort to nuclear weapons only as a reprisal, and
only in response to overwhelmingly destructive first-strike attacks. Correspondingly, anything less than an overwhelmingly destructive first-strike
would elicit a measured and proportionate Israeli military response. Moreover, by striking first, the enemy knows that it could have an advantage in “escalation dominance.” These calculations would be derived from the more or
less informed enemy view that Israel will never embrace the “unorthodox” at
the strategic level; that its actions will always be reactive, and that these reactions will always be limited.
But what if Israel were to fine-tune its “Samson Option?” What if it
did this in conjunction with certain doctrinal changes in its longstanding policy
of nuclear ambiguity? By taking the bomb out of the “basement” and by indicating, simultaneously, that its now declared nuclear weapons were not limited
to existential scenarios, Israel might go a long way to enhancing its national security. It would do this by displaying an apparent departure from perfect rationality; in essence, by expressing the rationality of threatened irrationality.
Whether or not such a display would be an example of “pretended irrationality”
or of an authentic willingness to act irrationally would be anyone’s guess. It
goes without saying that such an example of unorthodox behavior by Israel
might actually incite enemy first-strikes, or hasten the onset of already planned
strikes. There are ways, however, in which Israel could make Sun-Tzu’s “unorthodox” appear as “orthodox.”

How a Nuclear War Might Begin
Israel remains the openly declared national and religious object of
Arab and Islamic genocide. This term is used in the literal and jurisprudential
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sense, not merely as a figure of speech. No other country is in a similar predicament. What is Israel to do? How might Israel’s possible actions or inactions
affect the likelihood of a regional nuclear war in the Middle East? And in
what precise ways might a nuclear war actually begin between Israel and its
enemies?
Israel’s nuclear weapons, unacknowledged and unthreatening, exist
(as Prime Minister Olmert emphasized in his public remarks) only to prevent
certain forms of enemy aggression. This deterrent force would never be used
except in defensive reprisal for massive enemy first-strikes, especially if
these attacks involved nuclear or biological weapons. For a limited time, Israel’s acknowledged enemies are not yet nuclear. Even if this should change,
Israel’s nuclear weapons might continue to reduce the risks of unconventional war as long as the pertinent enemy states were to remain rational and
convinced that Israel would retaliate massively if attacked by nuclear and/or
certain biological weapons.
But there are many complex problems to identify if a bellicose enemy were allowed to acquire nuclear weapons; problems that belie the
seemingly agreeable notion of stable nuclear deterrence. Whether for reasons of miscalculation, accident, unauthorized capacity to fire, outright irrationality, or the presumed imperatives of jihad, such a state could still opt
to launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel in spite of the latter’s nuclear
posture. Israel would certainly respond with a nuclear retaliatory strike. Although nothing is publicly known about Israel’s precise targeting doctrine,
such a reprisal would surely be launched against the aggressor’s capital city
or another high-value, urban target. There would be no assurances, in response to this level of aggression, that Israel would limit itself to striking
military targets or even to the individual enemy state from which the aggression was launched.
What if enemy first-strikes involved only chemical or biological
weapons? Under such circumstances Israel might still launch a proportionate
nuclear reprisal, but this would depend upon Israel’s calculated expectations of
follow-on aggression and associated determinations of comparative damagelimitation. Even if Israel were to absorb a massive conventional first-strike, nuclear retaliation could not be ruled out. This is especially true if the aggressor
were perceived to hold nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in reserve; and/or if Israel’s leaders believed that non-nuclear retaliations would
not prevent national annihilation. As indicated previously, Project Daniel determined that the threshold of existential harms must be far lower than wholesale physical devastation.
Faced with imminent and existential attacks, Israel, taking a cue
from The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, dated 20
42
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September 2002, could preempt enemy aggression with conventional forces.
American strategy of preemptive attack affirms the growing reasonableness
of anticipatory self-defense under international law. If Israel were to draw
upon such expressions of US policy, the targeted state’s response would determine Israel’s subsequent moves. If this response were in any way nuclear,
Israel would assuredly undertake nuclear counter-retaliation. If this enemy
retaliation were to involve certain chemical and/or biological weapons, Israel
might also determine to undertake a quantum escalatory initiative.
If the enemy state’s response to Israeli preemption were limited to
hard-target conventional strikes, it is highly improbable that Israel would resort to nuclear counter-retaliation. On the other hand, if the enemy state’s
conventional retaliation were an all-out strike directed toward Israel’s civilian populations as well as to Israeli military targets—an existential strike—
Israeli nuclear counter-retaliation could not be ruled out. Such a counterretaliation would likely not be exercised if the enemy state’s conventional retaliations were entirely proportionate to Israel’s preemption; confined entirely to Israeli military targets; circumscribed by the legal limits of “military
necessity”; and accompanied by explicit and verifiable assurances of no further escalation.
It is exceedingly unlikely, but not entirely inconceivable, that
Israel would ever decide to preempt enemy state aggression with a nuclear
defensive strike. While circumstances could surely arise where such a defensive strike would be rational and also acceptable under international law
(such a policy has been embraced by the United States in Joint Publication
3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, dated 15 March 2005), it is improbable that Israel would ever permit itself to reach such circumstances.
An Israeli nuclear preemption could be expected only if: Israel’s state enemies had unexpectedly acquired nuclear or other unconventional weapons
presumed capable of destroying the Jewish State; these enemy states had
made explicit that their intentions paralleled their capabilities; these states
were authoritatively believed ready to begin a countdown-to-launch; and Israel believed that non-nuclear preemptions could not possibly achieve the
minimum needed levels of damage-limitation, levels consistent with its
own national survival.
Should nuclear weapons ever be introduced into a conflict between
Israel and the many countries that wish to destroy it, some form of nuclear
war-fighting would in all probability ensue. This would be true so long as: the
enemy state’s first-strikes would not destroy Israel’s second-strike nuclear
capability; the enemy state’s retaliation for Israeli conventional preemption
would not destroy Israel’s nuclear counter-retaliatory capability; Israeli
preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy enemy
Spring 2007

43

second-strike nuclear capabilities; and Israeli retaliation for the enemy
state’s conventional first-strikes would not destroy the enemy’s nuclear
counter-retaliatory capability. From the standpoint of protecting its security
and survival, Israel must now take proper steps to ensure its survival with respect to the scenarios outlined.
Both Israeli nuclear and non-nuclear preemptions of enemy unconventional aggressions might lead to nuclear exchanges. This would depend,
in part, upon the effectiveness and breadth of Israeli targeting, the surviving
number of enemy nuclear weapons, and the willingness of enemy leaders to
risk Israeli nuclear counter-retaliations. In any event, the likelihood of nuclear exchanges would be greatest when potential aggressors were permitted
to deploy numbers of unconventional weapons without eliciting Israeli or
American preemptions.
If such deployment were to take place, as now seems increasingly
likely, Israel might effectively forfeit the non-nuclear preemption option. Its
alternatives to nuclear preemption would no longer be a conventional preemption or simply waiting to be attacked. It is only natural to assume that the
risks of an Israeli nuclear preemption, of nuclear exchanges with an enemy
state, and of enemy nuclear first-strikes could all be dramatically reduced by
timely Israeli or American non-nuclear preemptions. These preemptions
would be directed at critical military targets and pertinent regimes. As outlined in the Project Daniel report, the latter option could include the dedicated
elimination of enemy leadership and scientific elites.

Israel’s Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity
We have suggested some of the ways in which a nuclear war might
begin between Israel and its enemies. From the standpoint of preventing such
a war, it is essential that Israel now protect itself with suitable policies of preemption, defense, and deterrence. This last set of policies, moreover, will depend substantially upon whether Israel continues to obscure its nuclear
strategy, or whether it decides to change from a formal nuclear posture of “deliberate ambiguity” to one of selected disclosure.
In one respect, the issue is already somewhat moot after Prime Minister Olmert’s statement. Indeed, it was already essentially moot more than
ten years ago, when then Prime Minister Shimon Peres made a somewhat similar public observation. Shortly after coming to power as Prime Minister,
Peres took the then unprecedented step of openly acknowledging Israel’s nuclear capability. Responding to press questions about the Oslo Peace Process
and the extent of Israeli concessions, he remarked that he would be delighted
to “give up the atom” if the entire region would only embrace a comprehen44
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sive security plan. Although this remark was certainly not an intended expression of changed nuclear policy, it did unwittingly raise the question of an
Israeli shift away from nuclear ambiguity.
Nuclear disclosure is far more than a simple “yes” or “no.” The basic
question was initially answered by Peres’ “offer” and subsequently by
Olmert. What needs to be determined is the timing of purposeful disclosure
and the extent to which Israel should communicate its nuclear capabilities
and intentions to selected states. This issue was central to the deliberations
undertaken by the Project Daniel panel, which concluded that Israel’s bomb
should “remain in the basement” as long as possible, but it should be more or
less revealed if enemy circumstances would change in an ominous fashion.
In essence, because the report stipulates the need for an expanded Israeli doctrine of preemption, the project’s statement on nuclear ambiguity advocates that Israel should “remove the bomb from its basement” if Israel
should have failed in its attempt to exploit the recommended doctrine of
preemption.
The rationale for Israeli nuclear disclosure does not lie in expressing
the obvious; that Israel has the bomb. Instead, it lies in the informed understanding that nuclear weapons can serve the nation’s security in a number of
ways, all of which may be of benefit depending on the extent to which certain
aspects of these weapons and the associated strategies are disclosed. The pertinent form and extent of disclosure is vital to Israeli nuclear deterrence.
To protect itself against enemy strikes, particularly those carrying
existential costs, Israel needs to exploit every component of its nuclear arsenal. The success of Israel’s efforts will depend in large measure not only upon
its chosen configuration of “counterforce” (hard-target) and “counter-value”
(city-busting) operations, but also upon the extent to which this configuration
is known in advance by enemy states. Before an enemy is deterred from
launching first-strikes against Israel or from launching retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemption, it may not be enough to simply “know” that Israel has the bomb. Potential enemies need to recognize that Israeli nuclear
weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to attack and they are aimed at highvalue targets. In this context, the Final Report of Project Daniel recommends
that “a recognizable retaliatory force should be fashioned with the capacity to
destroy some 15 high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent enemy
states in the Middle East.” This counter-value strategy means that Israel’s
second-strike response to enemy aggressions involving certain biological or
nuclear weapons would be unambiguously directed at enemy populations,
not at enemy weapons or infrastructures.
It may appear, at first glance, that Israeli targeting of enemy military
installations and troop concentrations (counterforce targeting) would be both
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more compelling as a deterrent and also more humane. But it is entirely likely
that a nuclear-armed enemy could conceivably regard any Israeli retaliatory
destruction of its armed forces as “acceptable” in certain circumstances. Such
an enemy may even conclude that the expected benefits of annihilating “the
Zionist entity” outweigh any expected retaliatory harms to its military. Under
such circumstances, Israel’s nuclear deterrent would fail, possibly with existential consequences.
It is highly unlikely, however, that any enemy state would ever
calculate that the expected benefits of annihilating Israel would outweigh the
expected costs of its own annihilation. Excluding an irrational actor—a prospect that falls outside the logic of nuclear deterrence—enemies of Israel
would assuredly refrain from nuclear or biological attacks that would presumptively elicit massive counter-value reprisals. This reasoning holds only
to the extent that these enemies fully believe that Israel will make good on its
announced strategy. Israel’s nuclear deterrent, once it were made explicit,
would need to state to all prospective nuclear enemies: “Israel’s nuclear
weapons, dispersed, multiplied, and hardened, are targeted upon your major
cities. These weapons will never be used against these targets except in retaliation for certain WMD aggressions. Unless our population centers are struck
first by nuclear attack, certain levels of biological attack, or by combined nuclear and biological attack, we will not harm your cities.”
Some readers may be disturbed by this reasoning, discovering in it
perhaps an ominous hint of “Dr. Strangelove.” Yet, the counter-value targeting strategy recommended by Project Daniel represents Israel’s best hope for
avoiding nuclear or biological warfare. It is the most humane strategy available. The Israeli alternative, an expressed counterforce targeting doctrine,
would produce a higher probability of nuclear or nuclear/biological war.
Such a war, even if all weapons remained targeted on the enemy’s military
forces and structures (an optimistic assumption) would almost certainly entail higher levels of collateral damage.
The very best weapons, Clausewitz wrote, are those that achieve
their objectives without ever actually being used. This is certainly the case
with nuclear weapons. Israel’s nuclear weapons can only succeed through
their non-use. Project Daniel made clear in its Final Report to Prime Minister
Sharon that nuclear war-fighting must always be avoided.
The Project Daniel Group recommends that Israel take whatever actions are necessary to prevent enemy nuclearization, up to and including certain acts of preemption. Should these measures fail (measures that are
permissible under international law as expressions of “anticipatory selfdefense”), the State of Israel should immediately end its posture of nuclear
ambiguity with open declarations of counter-value targeting. In fact, Prime
46

Parameters

Minister Olmert’s commentary on Israel’s nuclear capacity indicates that
such declarations may not be far off.

Israel’s Survival Amidst Growing Anarchy
In an age of total war, Israel must always remain fully aware of those
harms that would threaten its very continuance as a state. Although the Jewish
State has always recognized an overriding obligation to seek peace through
negotiation and diplomacy, there are times when its commitment to peaceful
settlement will not be reciprocated. Moreover, as noted earlier, there are
times when the idea of an existential threat may reasonably apply to a particular level of harm that falls well below the threshold of complete national
annihilation.
Examining pertinent possibilities, the Project Daniel study group
noted three distinct but interrelated existential threats to Israel:
  Biological or Nuclear (BN) threats from states.
  BN threats from terror organizations.
  BN threats from combined efforts of states and terror organizations.
To the extent that certain Middle Eastern states are permitted to
develop WMD capabilities, Israel may have to someday deal with an
anonymous attack scenario. In such a scenario the enemy state would not
identify itself, and Israeli post-attack identification might be exceedingly
difficult. What is Israel to do in such a situation? The Group recommended
to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that “Israel must identify explicitly and
early on that all enemy Arab states and Iran are subject to massive Israeli
reprisal in the event of a BN attack upon Israel.” We further recommended
that massive reprisals be targeted at between ten and 20 large enemy cities
(counter-value targeting) and that the nuclear yields of such Israeli reprisals be in the high range. Such deterrent threats would be very compelling
to all rational enemies, but at the same time have little or no effect upon irrational ones. In the case of irrational adversaries, Israel’s only hope for
safety will likely lie in the appropriate and operationally feasible acts of
preemption.
A policy of Mutual Assured Destruction that once existed between
the United States and the Soviet Union would never work between Israel and
its enemies. Rather, the Project Daniel Group recommended that Israel must
prevent its enemies from acquiring BN weapons, and that any notion of BN
“parity” between Israel and its enemies would be intolerable. Accordingly,
The Group advised Prime Minister Sharon that “Israel immediately adopt—
as highest priority—a policy of preemption with respect to enemy existential
threats.” Such a policy would be based upon a limited definition of “existenSpring 2007
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tial,” as described above, and would be designed to enhance Israel’s overall
deterrent posture.
Recognizing the close partnership and overlapping interests between Israel and the United States, the Project Daniel Group strongly supports the ongoing American Global War on Terrorism. In this connection,
the study group has urged full cooperation and mutuality between Jerusalem
and Washington regarding communication of intentions. If for any reason
the United States should decide against exercising preemption options
against certain nations and groups developing weapons of mass destruction
(a plausible expectation in the aftermath of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study
Group report), Israel must reserve for itself the unhindered prerogative to
undertake its own preemption options. Understood in the more formal language of international law, these operations would be an expression of “anticipatory self-defense.”
The Project Daniel Group began its initial deliberations with the
following concern: Israel faces the hazard of a suicide-bomber in macrocosm. In this scenario, an enemy Arab state or Iran would act against Israel
without ordinary regard for any retaliatory consequences. This is the same
fashion as the individual suicide bomber who acts without fear of personal
consequences, indeed, one who actually welcomes the most extreme personal consequence, death. An enemy would launch WMD attacks against Israel with full knowledge and expectation of overwhelming reprisals. The
conclusion to be drawn from this scenario is that Israeli deterrence vis-à-vis
“suicide states” would be immobilized by enemy irrationality and that the
only recourse in such circumstances would have been preemption.

Israel’s Preemption and Nuclear Warfighting Doctrine
International law is not a suicide pact. It has long permitted states
to initiate forceful defensive measures when the threat of “imminent danger” of aggression is present. This rule of “anticipatory self-defense” had
been expanded and reinforced by the issuance of The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America. Released on 20 September 2002,
this document asserts, inter alia, that traditional concepts of deterrence will
not work against an enemy “whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction
and the targeting of innocents . . . .” As Israel is substantially more vulnerable than the United States, its particular right to resort to anticipatory
self-defense under threat of identifiable existential harms is entirely beyond
legal questioning.
Considering the US strategy on expansion of preemption, the Project Daniel Group suggested to Prime Minister Sharon that such policy could
48
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pertain as well to certain nuclear or biological threats against Israel. The
group suggested that this policy be codified as doctrine, and that such responsive actions be conventional in nature. Preemption may be overt or covert,
and range from “decapitation” to full-scale military operations. Further, the
study group advised that decapitation may apply to both leadership elites
(state and non-state) and various technical experts essential to the fashioning
of enemy WMD arsenals. The Group reminded the Prime Minister that any
forcible “prevention” of enemy nuclear or biological deployments would be
profoundly distinct from the “preemption” of an existing enemy nuclear or
biological force. Attempts at preemption against an enemy that had already
obtained a nuclear or biological capacity might be far too risky and could
even invite an existential retaliation. It was also recommended that any preemption be carried out exclusively by conventional high-precision weapons,
not only because they are likely to be more effective than nuclear weapons,
but also because preemption with nuclear weapons might be wrongly interpreted as a nuclear first-strike. If unsuccessful, nuclear preemptive strikes
could elicit the enemy’s “counter-value” second strike; a deadly attack upon
Israeli civilian populations.
The Project Daniel Group emphatically advised that Israel should
avoid non-conventional exchanges with enemy states wherever possible. It is
not in Israel’s interest to engage these states in WMD warfare if other options
exist. Israel’s Strategic Future does not instruct how to win a war in a WMD
Middle-East environment. Rather, it describes what the members of Project
Daniel consider the necessary, realistic, and optimal conditions for nonbelligerence toward Israel. These conditions include a coherent and comprehensive Israeli doctrine for preemption, war-fighting, deterrence, and
defense.
The Project Daniel Group advised Prime Minister Sharon that there
is no operational need for low-yield nuclear weapons geared to actual battlefield use. Overall, we recommended that the most efficient yield for Israeli
deterrence and counterstrike purposes be a targeted (counter-value) warhead
designed at a level sufficient to destroy the aggressor’s principal population
centers and fully compromise national viability. The study group suggested
that Israel make every effort to avoid using nuclear weapons in support of
conventional operations. These weapons may create a seamless web from the
conventional to the nuclear battlefield, something Israel should scrupulously
avoid.
The Group considers it useful for Israel to plan for selective regimetargeting in certain residual instances. With direct threats targeted against
individual enemy leaders, costs to Israel would be much lower than with
alternative forms of warfare. Threats of regime targeting are often more perSpring 2007
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suasive than threats against the enemy’s weapons or infrastructures. However, such a strategy is based on the premise that the prospective targets are
first made to feel sufficiently at risk.
The Project Daniel Group provided a final set of suggestions related
to the lawful remedy of anticipatory self-defense. Israel should be empowered with a “Long Arm” to meet its preemption objectives. This translates to
the acquisition of long-range fighter aircraft with the capability to penetrate
deep, heavily defended areas, and to survive. It also means air-refueling tankers, communications satellites, long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, survivable precision weapons with high lethality, and refined electronic warfare and
stealth capacities. As of December 2006, it appears that much of our specific
advice related to such matters, especially air-refueling capabilities, has been
heeded.

Israel’s Deterrence and Defense Doctrine
The Project Daniel Group strongly recommended that the Prime
Minister accept a broad strategy of defensive first-strikes, but we also advised against his using Israel’s undisclosed nuclear arsenal for anything but
essential deterrence. This means that enemy states must recognize the fact
that certain forms of aggression against Israel will elicit massive Israeli nuclear reprisals against city targets. At the present time we suggest that such
an understanding can be communicated by Israel without more explicit nuclear disclosure, but the group also recognizes that the adequacy of nuclear
ambiguity would change immediately if enemy nuclearization should become a reality.
Nuclear deterrence, ambiguous or partially disclosed, is essential
to Israel’s physical survival. If, for whatever reason, Israel should fail to
prevent enemy state nuclearization, it will have to refashion its nuclear
deterrent. But even if this should require purposeful disclosure of nuclear
assets and doctrine, such revelations would have to be limited to that required to convince Israel’s enemies of its capacity and resolve. This would
mean revealing only those aspects needed to identify the survivability and
penetration-capability of Israel’s nuclear forces and its political will to
launch massive retaliation.
The Project Daniel Group advised Prime Minister Sharon that Israel should always do whatever it can to ensure a secure and recognizable
second-strike nuclear capability. Once nuclear ambiguity is ended, nuclear
disclosure will play a crucial communications role. The essence of deterrence lies in communicating the nation’s capacity and will to those who
would do Israel harm. Admittedly, the retaliatory use of nuclear weapons by
50
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Israel would signify failure of its deterrent. Recalling the thoughts of the ancient Chinese military thinker Sun-Tzu, the very highest form of military
success is achieved when one’s strategic objectives can be met without any
actual use of force.
To meet its primary deterrence objective—deterrence of enemy
first-strikes—Israel must seek and achieve a visible second-strike capability
with the ability to target approximately 15 enemy cities. Ranges should encompass cities in Libya and Iran, with nuclear bomb yields at levels sufficient
to fully compromise the aggressor’s viability as a functioning state. By utilizing counter-value-targeted warheads for maximum destruction, Israel could
achieve the optimal deterrent effect, thereby neutralizing the overall asymmetry between any enemy state and the State of Israel. Enemy targets would
be selected with the understanding that their destruction would promptly
force the aggressor to cease all nuclear, biological, and/or chemical exchanges.
The Group was secure in its understanding that all of its recommendations to the Prime Minister related to Israeli nuclear deterrence were fully
consistent with authoritative international law. On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice at The Hague (not known for pro-Israel sympathies)
handed down its Advisory Opinion on “The Legality of the Threat or Use of
Force of Nuclear Weapons.” The final paragraph concludes, inter alia:
The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles
and rules of humanitarian law. However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or
unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.

The Project Daniel Group advised Prime Minister Sharon that Israel
must display flexibility in its nuclear deterrence posture in order to respond to
an enemy’s expansion of nuclear weapons. It may be necessary under certain
circumstances for Israel to deploy a full “triad” of strategic nuclear forces.
For now, however, we recommended that Israel continue to manage without
nuclear missile-bearing submarines. This recommendation would hold true
only as long as the probability of an enemy or combination of enemies destroying Israel’s land-based and airborne-launched nuclear missiles in a
first-strike attack remains low.
Israel’s nuclear deterrent should be reinforced by far-reaching active defenses. The Group emphasized that Israel should take immediate
steps to operationalize an efficient, multi-layered antiballistic missile sysSpring 2007
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tem capable of intercepting and destroying a finite number of enemy warheads. This missile defense system would require a high probability of
success with a reliable capacity for distinguishing between incoming warheads and decoys.
In particular, Israel’s “Arrow Missile Defense System” is being developed to fill this strategic need. The Israel Air Force (IAF), which operates
the Arrow, is committed to meeting its goal of deploying interceptors on
schedule. Such a capability would reinforce Israel’s qualitative edge over its
adversaries. Israeli engineers are making every effort to ensure that the Arrow will integrate effectively with the American “Patriot Missile System.”
The Project Daniel Group advised the IAF to continue energetically working
on all interoperability issues related to missile defense.
In its effort to create a multi-layered defense system, Israel is rumored to be working on an unmanned aircraft capable of hunting-down and
killing enemy mobile-ballistic missile launchers. Israeli military officials
have tried to interest the United States in joining the launcher-attack project,
known formally as “boost-phase launcher intercept” (BPLI). The Project
Daniel Group advised Prime Minister Sharon that Israel should undertake
BPLI with or without US support, recognizing, however, that gaining such
support would permit the project to move forward more expeditiously and
with greater cost-effectiveness.
Project Daniel underscored the criticality of multi-layered active defenses for Israel, but affirmed certain that Israel must always prepare to act
preemptively before any destabilizing deployment of enemy nuclear and/or
certain biological weapons.

Conclusions
Reflecting on Project Daniel’s efforts, the group has been able to
evaluate the broad range of recommendations contained in Israel’s Strategic
Future. These recommendations concern, inter alia:
 The manifest need for an expanded policy of preemption.
 An ongoing re-evaluation of “nuclear ambiguity.”
 Recognizable preparations for appropriate “counter-value” reprisals in the case of certain WMD aggressions.
 Adaptations to a “paradigm shift” away from classical patterns
of warfare.
 Expanded cooperation with the United States in the Global War
on Terrorism and in future inter-state conflicts in the Middle East.
 Deployment of suitable active defense systems.
 Avoidance of nuclear war-fighting wherever possible.
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Various ways to improve Israel’s nuclear deterrence.
Vital differences between rational and non-rational adversaries.
 Changing definitions of existential harms.
 Legal elements of “anticipatory self-defense.”
 Possibilities for the peaceful settlement of disputes in the region.
 Budgetary constraints and opportunities.
 The maintenance of Israel’s qualitative edge.
 Preparations for “regime targeting.”
 Implications for Israel related to the growing anarchy in world
affairs.
Israel’s Strategic Future should be understood as a work in progress.
The geo-strategic context within which Israel must fashion its future is continually evolving, and so, accordingly, must its strategic doctrine. Ultimately,
such doctrine will serve as the foundation underpinning the Jewish State’s
policies and strategies.
Since the presentation of our original document to Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon on 16 January 2003 there have been a few minor “victories” in
the effort to control WMD proliferation among Israel’s enemies. A case in
point is Libya. At the same time, the circumstances in North Korea (which has
manifest ties to some of Israel’s regional enemies), Iran, and Pakistan remain
highly volatile and dangerous. There is also evidence of expanding WMD
ambitions in Egypt and Syria. With regard to terrorist groups (several are sustained by Arab and Islamic states), new alignments are being fashioned
between various Palestinian organizations and al Qaeda. The precise configurations of these alignments are complex and multifaceted, but the net effect
for Israel is unmistakably serious.
Israel’s Strategic Future is founded on the presumption that current
threats of war, terrorism and genocide derive from a very clear “clash of civilizations,” and not merely from narrow geo-strategic differences. Both Israel
and the United States are unambiguously in the cross-hairs of a worldwide Islamic “jihad” that is fundamentally cultural and theological in nature, and
that will not concede an inch to the conventional norms of “coexistence” or
“peaceful settlement.” This threat to “unbelievers” is less than comforting to
Jerusalem and Washington; however, it is a threat that must be acknowledged
and dealt with intelligently.
The ongoing war in Iraq has demonstrated the evident weaknesses of
national intelligence agencies to provide critical warnings in an effort to
enhance strategic stability. Israel is not without a history of intelligence failure (lately, Israeli problems in the 2006 Lebanon War). Israel’s strategic future will require an enhanced intelligence infrastructure and highly-refined
“backup systems.” Facing growing isolation in the world community—a
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community willing to disregard Arab and Islamic acts of terrorism—Israel
finds itself often in the unenviable position of having to fend for itself more
than ever before. In the end, Israel’s survival will depend upon strategies,
plans, and policies of its own making. These initiatives will themselves require a broader and more creative pattern of strategic thought if they are to be
successful.
We learn from Ecclesiastes (34:1) that “Vain hopes delude the senseless, and dreams give wings to a fool’s fancy.” Israel’s strategic future is
fraught with existential risk and danger; it is essential, therefore, that friends
of Israel now approach this future with utter realism and candor. A nuclear
war against the Jewish State would likely be undertaken as a distinct form of
genocide, and there can be no greater obligation for Israel than to ensure protection against such crimes. It is with the sober understanding that Holocaust
can take new forms at the beginning of the twenty-first century that Project
Daniel completed its critical work.
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